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Offshoring, local market entry, and the strategic context of cross-border alliances: 
the impact on the governance mode 
 
Abstract 
International alliances have been studied in considerable depth, but almost entirely as host 
market entry options. And while much global value production is done through international 
alliances, the organizational forms used to control dispersed value chains are often reduced to 
“make or buy” – that is, captive operations vs. market-based outsourcing. We examine how 
strategic purpose (vertical or offshore production vs. horizontal or production for local market 
entry) affects the choice of cooperative governance form. We contend that an offshore 
production role, as opposed to a market entry strategy, makes an alliance more likely to be 
governed as a contractual alliance than as a joint venture. Data on 261 cross-border alliances in 
the major appliances industry largely support our hypotheses. Further, strategic purpose 
moderates the effects of alliance activities and of the institutional environment of the host 
country on the choice of governance form. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Keywords: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Global production networks, Governance, 
Household products, Offshoring 
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Offshoring, local market entry, and the strategic context of cross-border alliances: 
the impact on the governance mode 
 
1. Introduction 
 International alliances are defined as collaborative agreements involving multiple 
business organizations located in different countries. They can be governed as simple contractual 
alliances (international contractual alliances) or as shared equity alliances (international joint 
ventures) in which a jointly owned entity is created (Contractor & Ra, 2002; Gulati & Singh, 
1998). The choice of the appropriate transactional governance mode is a major consideration in 
studies of cooperative strategies (Child, Faulkner & Tallman, 2005; Hennart, 1988; 
Hutzschenreuter, Lewin, & Dresel, 2011; Madhok & Tallman, 1998). In the literature, this 
choice has mainly been addressed in the context of local host market entry within a market-
seeking (horizontal) strategy on the part of a multinational corporation (MNC) (Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007). The decision by an MNC to use a long-term contract as opposed to a joint 
venture when the strategic purpose of the alliance is to access offshore value-adding activities 
(vertical strategy) has been largely overlooked (Jahns, Hartmann, & Bals, 2006; Tallman & 
Mudambi, 2013). However, the increasing use of joint production in global value chains suggests 
to us that a better understanding of how strategic purpose (horizontal vs. vertical) affects 
governance choices for international alliance strategies is a relevant concern to international 
strategy.  
The increasing importance of geographically dispersed global value production 
(commonly, offshore production or just “offshoring”) for goods and services is linked to 
economic, political and legal changes, socio-demographic trends, and rapid increases in 
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technology development in potential host countries. In its broadest explanation, offshoring refers 
to situating value-adding activities within a vertical value chain in locations outside the target 
market country’s boundaries (Monczka et al., 2005). It occurs when companies disperse their 
value chain activities to those locations in which they can be carried out most effectively and 
efficiently, independent of the market(s) in which the products are sold, thereby creating 
arbitrage opportunities for geographically dispersed value production (Mudambi, 2008).i Firms 
use a variety of organizational forms to implement and control offshoring, but these often have 
been reduced to the choice of ‘make or buy’; that is, captive (i.e., wholly owned) operations 
versus outsourcing via market transactions to specialist suppliers. This stark contrast suggests 
that only the simplest, least strategic supply agreements should be exposed to market 
transactional risks – more complex or essential activities should be internalized. However, it is 
clearly the case for both manufacturing and services that critical value-adding activities 
frequently are outsourced to offshore suppliers (Lewin & Volberda, 2011).  
We believe that the extensive use of outsourcing in global value chains is better 
interpreted using Mudambi and Tallman’s (2010) argument that most outsourcing transactions 
actually are structured as alliances – “allying to access” resources rather than “buying from the 
external market”. They propose that when the resources that the firm is trying to access are 
complex or involve tacit knowledge, international alliances are likely to improve trust and 
coordination and introduce a more stable, more collaborative and lower risk transactional setting 
than arms’ length markets, but at a lower cost than wholly-owned subsidiaries (Gulati & Singh, 
1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012). Indeed, the growing use of international alliances in global value 
chains is well documented (McDermott, Mudambi, & Parente, 2013) in diverse industries such 
as electronics, aircraft manufacturing, or pharmaceuticals. 
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We ask two basic research questions to illuminate the impact of strategic purpose on the 
control of alliances. First, does the strategic purpose of an international alliance – that is, the use 
of the alliances to produce for local host markets as opposed to generate value for non-local 
(regional, global or home) markets – moderate the use of contractual vs. equity-based 
governance modes? Second, does the set of activities engaged in by an alliance relate differently 
to the choice of governance mode depending on this strategic purpose? To address these 
questions, we incorporate the body of knowledge tied to international alliances (Dunning, 1995; 
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Pan & Tse, 1996) with that of offshoring and global value chains 
(Khan, Shenkar, & Lew, 2015; Lewin & Volberda, 2011). In doing so, we contribute to the 
literature on international alliances by showing how offshoring, seen as a strategic purpose of the 
alliance, invites the adoption of contractual governance modes, while market-seeking is 
preferably managed through joint ventures. This argument implies that global value-adding 
activities are likely to be constructed of centrally directed networks of contractual alliances. We 
also suggest that offshoring interacts with the type of value chain activities shared in the alliance 
and with the host country institutional factors to determine the governance mode. While a 
transaction cost perspective is compatible with our conclusions, we mostly base our reasoning on 
the idea that equity solutions in international alliances are driven by the need for coordination in 
complex transactions (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). 
To test our hypotheses, we study the effects of the strategic purposes of international 
aliances in the home appliances industry, which has a long history of cross-border deals that 
industry players have used both to pursue offshoring and to enter new markets. Home appliances 
are globally ubiquitous, the core technologies used in different markets differ relatively little, and 
cost competition is intense. International sourcing is common and has been in place for decades. 
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Our findings show that indeed strategic purpose does matter, in that the use of joint ventures is 
less frequent than contractual alliances for offshore-production alliances than for market entry. 
We also find that the strategic purpose of the alliance moderates the effects of various activity 
and location variables on the choice of alliance governance form, e.g., a manufacturing role 
makes a joint venture significantly more likely in the case of an offshoring strategy, but less so 
for a market entry strategy.  
The next section of the paper addresses the literature of alliance governance, followed by 
the development of a model of governing offshore outsourcing and the statement of various 
hypotheses. This is followed by a set of empirical tests and discussion of the impact of strategic 
purpose on alliance governance. We close with an appeal to consider how important the explicit 
adoption of a cooperative alternative is to understanding the drivers and consequences of 
governing geographically dispersed value-adding activities. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1. The governance of international alliances 
 Two theoretical perspectives of the several applied to international alliances (Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007) are most relevant to our analysis. First, from a transaction cost analysis 
perspective, international alliances are intermediate forms between markets and hierarchies 
(Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Oxley, 1997). As levels of transaction specific investment increase 
under conditions of uncertainty and small numbers, the value of more hierarchy-like forms 
increases. While various models offer somewhat different mechanisms, they all reflect the 
concept that the more complex, strategic, and uncertain the international alliance, the more likely 
a joint venture will be put in place. 
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Second, a resource-based perspective suggests that the need for coordination in more 
complex transactions (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003), rather than fears of 
partner opportunism, drives the choice of equity solutions. Joint ventures are expected to allow 
for a more adaptable cooperative transaction. Coordination costs in the resource-based view are 
tied to the complexity of international alliance transactions that increase interdependencies 
between the partners, both technological and social (White & Lui, 2005). Sharma and Erramilli 
(2004) state that contractual modes are likely when the transaction is driven by easily 
transmissible explicit knowledge, while joint ventures will occur when complementary resources 
are tacit. The firm-like structure of joint ventures facilitates joint activities, enables tacit 
knowledge sharing, and supports the development of relationships among partners to the joint 
venture (Liu, Adair, & Bello, 2015; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Oxley & Wada, 2010; Tallman & 
Shenkar, 1994). Oxley and Sampson (2004) show that a broader scope of knowledge and 
activities, such as the combination of manufacturing and R&D capabilities, makes the use of 
equity forms of governance more likely in international alliances.  
Overall, both perspectives suggest that more complex transactions involving greater 
interdependencies between partners with more reliance on tacit knowledge will make the 
hierarchy-like governance structures of joint ventures more likely (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
Superior coordination of resources and capabilities in joint ventures will offset greater 
transaction specific investment, while giving both partners reason to avoid opportunistic actions 
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012). However, international alliances can be 
established for different purposes, in particular to govern offshore outsourcing rather than enter 
foreign markets, raising the question of how these purposes impact on factors that drive 
governance mode decisions. We address this question in the next sections. 
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2.2. Market-seeking vs. offshoring as strategic purposes of international alliances 
 We focus on whether a horizontal strategy to better access the local host market leads to 
different tendencies in governance of an international alliance than does vertical offshoring in the 
global value chain. The alternative governance choices considered are non-equity contractual 
alliances versus equity-based joint ventures, since the decision to use or not use equity 
participation is the predominant focus of studies of international alliance governance (Globerman 
& Nielsen, 2007; Hennart, 1988; Pan & Tse, 2000).  
The original models of foreign direct investment in value-adding activities focused on 
market-seeking strategies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Local host country activities were 
assumed to be substitutes for trade and licensing into the host market (Dunning, 1988). 
International alliances were largely seen as second-best alternatives to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries when foreign markets limited equity participation (Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). 
International alliances, as with other entry modes, were treated as horizontal investments to 
govern the introduction of resources or products developed in one market into another (Brouthers 
& Hennart, 2007). Particularly in mature industries, local partners could provide strategic skills 
for the local market, with the MNC providing technology and branding (Contractor & Lorange, 
1988). However, international alliances to service the host market customer base may require 
many interacting strategic decisions by the local management and high levels of coordination 
between partners. So, a resource-based perspective suggests that a joint venture, as a separate 
entity with a degree of managerial independence, is more effective in governing market-seeking 
alliances than a contractual venture without its own dedicated management.  
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 Offshored activities, as parts of a globally dispersed value chain, are more likely to be 
narrowly defined with clearly specified objectives and coordinated with other value-adding 
activities in other locations by a global or regional headquarter. At the same time, modern 
communication and contracting technology has made communication of resources much more 
effective (Asmussen, Larsen & Pedersen, 2016; McDermott et al., 2013). This makes for fairly 
straightforward and lower cost inter-firm transactions, reducing the benefit of internalization. 
From a resource-based perspective, offshoring may well be controlled by contractual 
arrangements, particularly in mature industries with well-understood products and demand 
characteristics. According to transaction cost models, threats of opportunism may still exist, in 
that a contractor must have some access to the underlying technology to generate component 
goods or services; moreover, failure to deliver can hurt the entire value chain. However, in 
industries where technologies are established and reputations are widely shared, opportunism by 
suppliers can be limited by contracting, parent firm experience, use of multiple suppliers, 
partner-specific relational investing, modular production techniques, and reputational effects 
enhanced by modern information technology. All these factors suggest that contracts can offer 
sufficient protection and oversight to maintain global value chains. Indeed, joint ventures may 
offer local equity-holding partners more opportunity to interfere with strategic decision-making 
or to divert production to local markets, and they offer more opportunities for unintended 
exposure of related technology and managerial methods than do contractual alliances. This leads 
us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The use of joint ventures versus contractual alliances is less likely when 
the primary strategic purpose of an international alliance is offshore production of value for 
international markets as compared to local market entry. 
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2.3. The role of activity content in shaping the governance mode of international alliances 
 Individual firms vary greatly in selecting which of their activities can best be offshored 
(Jensen & Pedersen, 2011). Firms are generally expected to maintain the tightest control over 
core activities and outsource less critical tasks to more efficient specialists (McDermott et al., 
2013). A resource-based perspective suggests that more complex activities requiring more 
interdependency among partners are more likely to be governed as a joint venture (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2003). In the foreign direct investment literature, with its focus on market-seeking 
investment, international alliances result from intermediate levels of market inefficiency. 
Hennart (1988) writes that joint ventures result when both sides are providing complex tacit 
knowledge for which markets fail. A resource-based approach would say that integrating 
complex tacit knowledge requires the flexibility and relationships that are built in joint ventures, 
while transmitting explicit knowledge can be managed effectively through contracts (Phene & 
Tallman, 2012). For offshore production, modular design principles suggest that the interfaces 
between modules must be clearly specified, while the processes within the module can be given 
local autonomy, so long as the outputs are to specification for the next module (McDermott et 
al., 2013). Thus, the strategic purpose may be seen as moderating the effect of different task 
responsibilities on the international alliance governance decision. We look in particular at three 
value-chain activities – manufacturing, marketing, and R&D – that constitute identifiable 
functions within an alliance that are considered highly characteristic of its contents (Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004). In our reasoning, we focus on how each activity interacts with the strategic 
purpose of the alliance to determine different degrees of transactional complexity. 
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 Manufacturing. In the previous literature, authors worked on the core hypothesis that the 
stage in the product life cycle, the product content (e.g. technology intensity), the need to 
respond to local needs and the value-to-weight ratio determine a certain manufacturing strategy 
and, in particular, the choice of a foreign location (DuBois, Toyne, & Oliff, 1993). Contractor 
and Kundu (1998) argue that when the proprietary content of products is high the international 
alliance form will tend towards joint ventures. Rugman and Verbeke (2003) show that joint 
ventures are particularly relevant to complex activities such as manufacturing. In the case of 
production for local markets, though, licensing by the MNC to a local manufacturer that is then 
allowed to manage other local market duties independently is a well established alternative 
(Dunning, 1988). In Brouthers and Hennart’s (2007) terms, the local partner’s inputs may be 
tacit and complex, but the MNC’s technology can be specified. So, a license for local production 
is feasible, especially for mature products. For example, the MNC needs only provide design 
specifications to local producers for the traditional production of metal appliances.  
In the case of offshoring, though, the transactional complexity of a dispersed production 
network, the necessity to meet different local expectations for product characteristics, the 
existence of international standards for quality and performance, and the importance of quick 
response to global needs determine greater coordination needs for manufacturing activities. 
These needs favor relational linkages. The activities of the local partner must be constrained to 
its part in the manufacturing network, and the MNC has to provide the tacit and complex inputs 
for which market-like transactions typically fail (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Equity ownership 
offers a degree of hierarchical control over alliance processes, and we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2a. When an international alliance includes manufacturing activities, the use 
of joint ventures is more likely than that of contractual alliancess if the primary strategy of the 
 12 
international alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to 
local market entry. 
 
 Marketing. This is also a complex activity requiring knowledge of both the product and 
the preferences of consumers, especially for market-seeking horizontal investments that are 
established as international alliances. In these alliances, the product and technological 
capabilities of the MNC need to be augmented by a deep understanding of local demand that is 
often tied to cultural preferences, local market characteristics, and geographical issues that can 
affect production (Asmussen et al., 2016). Strategies dependent on local marketing efforts seem 
likely to require close coordination of different capabilities, adaptability to demand variations on 
the part of the local partner, and strong needs for MNC partners to protect brand identities. Such 
high levels of interdependence suggest the need for more partner accommodation (Bello, 
Katsikeas, & Robson, 2010), a condition more feasible in joint ventures.  
In the case of marketing alliances with a broader geographical scope, evidence is mixed 
(Li, Boulding, & Staelin, 2010), with less internationally experienced firms tending to use joint 
ventures and more experienced firms tending toward non-equity forms. Marketing activities such 
as global advertising campaigns are often outsourced to multinational advertising firms via long-
term contracts. International firms also typically have affiliates in many markets to conduct 
activities such as media buying, while distribution may be outsourced for efficiency to local 
distributors that carry many products, all specifiable activities. 
Overall, we see the transactional complexity in this case to be greater for marketing in a 
local market than for geographically broad marketing efforts. We anticipate that entry strategies 
with marketing goals will tend toward equity ties with local partners both to ease concerns for 
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brand corruption and to ensure coordination in the local market, while globally directed 
marketing will be more likely to use contractual arrangements. So, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2b. When an international alliance includes marketing activities, the use of 
joint ventures is less likely than that of contractual alliances if the primary strategy of the 
international alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to 
local market entry. 
 
 R&D. The offshoring of R&D is a growing phenomenon. MNCs locate R&D activities 
abroad to benefit from unique capabilities available in foreign countries (Maskell, Pedersen, 
Petersen, & Dick-Nielsen, 2007), to adapt to local requirements (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005), 
and to be close to production facilities (Sanna-Randaccio & Veugelers, 2007). Foreign R&D has 
traditionally been seen as primarily local development-focused, providing host market 
adaptations for technologies imported by MNCs from home and produced locally – what 
Kuemmerle (1997) describes as competence augmenting innovation. R&D-related factors that 
widely influence the governance mode include the extent of inter-partner interaction, the 
complexity of the task undertaken by the alliance, types of partners, and scope of R&D activities 
(Choi & Contractor, 2016; Li & Xie, 2016). While most often associated with wholly-owned 
subsidiaries due to the need to protect both technical and brand identity (Gubbi & Elango, 2016), 
the same concerns suggest that product development for local markets, when handled by an 
international alliance, is more likely to be carried out via a joint venture. 
From an offshoring perspective, R&D activities located in a foreign country are used to 
create knowledge for application to global production. Innovation is the primary driving force 
behind competence-creating subsidiaries, sourcing local knowledge flows associated with higher 
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‘upstream’ R&D expenditures (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2011). However, as Sanna-Randaccio and 
Veugelers (2007) affirm, R&D offshoring intensifies the spillover of valuable know-how to 
competitors located in the foreign markets. Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) suggest that when R&D 
is less closely tied to manufacturing for the local market, for instance in the case of 
pharmaceutical trials in India for drugs intended for Western industrial markets (Haakonsson, 
Jensen, & Mudambi, 2013), the openness required in joint ventures discourages their use. Rather, 
R&D activities are assigned to host-country contractors with specifically limited access to the 
parent company’s technology. Overall, we conclude that the use of joint ventures in international 
alliances that include R&D will be less common when their strategic purpose is offshoring rather 
than for market seeking, and hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2c. When an international alliance includes R&D activities, the use of joint 
ventures is less likely than the use of contractual alliances if the main purpose of the international 
alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to local market 
entry 
  
2.4. The impact of location in determining the governance mode of international alliances 
 Country characteristics also affect the governance mode of international alliances. Phene 
and Tallman (2012) refer to “contextual uncertainty” when the administrative and socio-
economic features of the host country are very different from the country of origins. Differences 
in protection of intangible assets, degree of corruption, legal framework, economic development, 
and informal institutions create an uncertainty than firms need to mitigate (Haakonsson et al., 
2013; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). The location assumes a particular significance if characterized 
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by instability of regulatory obligations or intellectual property regimes. Many emerging markets 
in particular are still characterized by “institutional voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 2011).  
The level of a country’s governance infrastructure is shown to be inversely correlated 
with the need to create equity controls in alliances (Globerman & Nielsen, 2007; Pan et al., 
2014). The higher the contextual uncertainty created by weak local public institutions, the more 
uncertain the ability to enforce contracts and the more likely is ownership involvement by the 
MNC. This argument suggests that joint ventures can substitute for weak institutions (Hennart, 
1988). For this reason, it is possible to infer that countries with strong institutions will constitute 
a better environment for contractual alliances to prosper, while in countries with weaker 
institutions, joint ventures should be more common. However, we expect the effect to be 
stronger for alliances engaged in offshore production, since MNCs must coordinate the local 
activities in one place with other value-adding activities in other locations. Moreover, contract 
violations in a global supply chain can have company-wide consequences; therefore, MNCs will 
be more in need of enforceable contracts and institutional stability. In contrast, when the 
international alliance is intended to serve the host market, the damages coming from violations 
of contracts and partner opportunism are more likely to remain confined at the local level. So, we 
predict:  
Hypothesis 3. The negative correlation between a stronger host country institutional 
environment and the use of joint ventures will be greater when the purpose of the international 
alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to local market 
entry  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and Data 
 The sample consists of international alliances in the home appliances industry (SIC code 
363) between 1986 and 2012. We chose this industry for three reasons. First, it is a truly global 
industry with important producers and large markets in all major economic regions. Second, this 
industry has undergone significant restructuring and dynamism during the past thirty years 
(Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007): numerous mergers and acquisitions took place, with 
the objectives being consolidation and international expansion. Finally, offshoring is intense 
among major appliance manufacturers, because competition is based on cost efficiencies and the 
use of remote locations for performing supply chain activities at lower cost. 
The data source was SDC Platinum, a comprehensive set of databases maintained by 
Thomson Reuters Financial Securities Data (Schilling, 2009). The logic was to include all the 
international alliances in which at least one of the participants operated in the home appliance 
industry (as defined through its SIC code) and the declared purpose of the deal included 
manufacturing, marketing, or R&D activities directly related to home appliances. The initial list 
consisted of 386 deals; we had to drop 74 of them because they lacked information that we 
needed to code our variables, and in particular our OFFSHORE dummy, e.g. the strategic 
objectives and the activities of the deal were not detailed enough to establish whether it was 
mainly intended to serve the local market or to offshore value chain activities. We then removed 
51 domestic deals (i.e., all the participants were from the same country, which was also the 
location of the alliance), leaving us with 261 cross-border deals based in 46 different countries. 
Table 1 lists the locations of the deals and the home countries of the participating firms. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of years; the histogram reveals peak years in 1994 and 1995.  
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.2. Dependent variable 
 Our dependent variable is the governance mode adopted by the partners for a particular 
international alliance. When SDC Platinum did not detail the governance mode we traced the 
original press news and other company information at the time of the announcement. In coding 
this variable, we looked at the original governance mode at the date of announcement, ignoring 
possible subsequent mode dynamics (Pedersen, Petersen, & Benito, 2002). We have three 
governance modes: joint ventures, strategic alliances that did not involve equity injections of any 
kind, and strategic alliances with minority investments of at least one of the partners in the equity 
of the other. Observations are respectively 200, 54, and 7 for the three cases. We choose to group 
minority investments with contractual alliances, because in general minority stakes do not entail 
the degree of risk and the level of coordination between partners that are typical of joint 
ventures. Therefore, our dependent variable is JV, which takes the value 1 when the deal is a 
joint venture (excluding minority equity investments), and 0 otherwise. However, as a robustness 
check, we also coded an EQUITY dummy, which takes the value 1 when the deal is a joint 
venture or a minority equity investment, and 0 otherwise.  
3.3. Independent variables 
 To test the effects of the offshoring vs. market-seeking strategic orientations we built a 
dummy variable, OFFSHORE, that takes the value 1 if the international alliance was not mainly 
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intended to serve the local market and 0 otherwise. We defined the local market as the country 
where the international alliance was located. The guiding criterion was that market-seeking uses 
production and distribution to serve local markets, while offshoring is driven by resource-
seeking, efficiency-seeking, or knowledge-seeking goals to produce for international markets. 
Ideally, market-seeking could be operationalized through the local sales of the venture (Nachum 
& Zaheer, 2005), but such data were not available for our sample. For most deals the dominant 
focus was already clear in the deal description in the SDC database. For other deals, we coded 
this variable on the basis of information taken from press releases and company materials. When 
different markets were reported in the description of the international alliance, we coded the 
observation as 0 if the local market was quantitatively dominant (e.g., it represented the expected 
majority of sales) or was mentioned as the primary purpose of the deal. We did not treat these 
mixed cases as a distinct category because it was usually impossible to exclude that a share of 
the appliances was exported (in case of market-seeking deals) or sold in the local market (in case 
of offshoring). All the observations were first coded by a research assistant and then 
independently by one of the authors, achieving a 86.2% inter-coder agreement rate, which is 
deemed reliable (Neuendorf, 2002). Dubious cases were solved after collecting further 
information; the remaining uncertain observations were abandoned. 
 To evaluate the effects of the activities managed by the international alliance, we built 
three dummy variables, related to Hypotheses 2a–c: MANUFACTURING, MARKETING, and 
R&D. Each of them takes the value 1 if the international alliance managed activities of the 
relevant type and 0 otherwise. The MANUFACTURING dummy covers assembly of products, 
production of components and manufacturing services; the MARKETING dummy covers 
distribution, selling, and promotion; the R&D dummy covers basic and applied research and 
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product development. Since many parallel activities may be the object of the venture, these 
dummies are not mutually exclusive, which allowed us to include all these dummies in the same 
regression without identifying a baseline case. Again, we traced the original press coverage and 
companies’ information to fill holes or solve discrepancies in the SDC database, dropping the 
observations in which it was impossible to determine the activities of the international alliance. 
To test the effects of the location institutional environment, we used the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators. The indicators are six: control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and 
accountability. These indicators are based on variables obtained from 31 different data sources 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The indicators are available starting from 1996; for the 
preceding years (our sample starts with 1986) we used the first available value in the series. The 
variance shared by the six indicators is large, with pairwise correlations ranging from 0.54 to 
0.94 in our sample. Therefore, we averaged the indicators, obtaining our WGIMEAN variable, 
which we use as a composite and comprehensive measure of institutional quality of the location 
countries. 
3.4. Control variables 
 We used a number of control variables. First, we included product dummies, because 
different household appliances may involve different levels of transaction-specific assets, tacit 
knowledge, and technological and organizational complexity. We coded three dummies: 
SMALL_EL (small electrical appliances, which usually have low technological complexity); 
NON_HH (non-household appliances, e.g. those used in restaurants, which are sold through 
different distribution channels than home appliances); LARGE_EL (large electrical appliances, 
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which usually have higher technological complexity). The baseline case consists in non-electrical 
appliances, such as ovens, cooktops, and ranges. 
We controlled for the previous experience of partners, since learning helps firms 
overcome behavioral uncertainty (Tong & Li, 2013). To capture this dimension, we computed 
EXPERIENCE, which counts how many deals (irrespective of the governance mode) partners 
entered in the five years before the focal deal. We also controlled for geographic distance 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014) by calculating the average of “great circle distances” (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008) between the capital city of the location country of the international alliance 
and the capital cities of the home countries of the participants in the deal (DISTANCE). We 
added a MULTILATERAL dummy that takes the value 1 if more than two partners are engaged 
in the venture and 0 otherwise, because multilaterality has been shown to increase the probability 
of joint ventures (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). The GDP of the location country was used as a 
measure of the local market size, which can influence the mode of entry. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to collect financial information for most firms, for a mix 
of reasons: financial statements for the 80s’ or the 90s’ were not available; a number of firms 
were located in countries where financial information was scarce in general (e.g. East Germany 
or USSR); others were conglomerates (such as Samsung or Matsushita) that did not consistently 
report segmental financial information for household appliances. Therefore, to control for firm 
size (Roza, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2011) we manually compiled a list of large players in 
the industry, basing on their having established brands (internationally or in significant world 
regions, such as China or Latin America), multinational presence, multiple product categories, 
and being listed in stock exchanges. When compiling the list, we kept track of mergers and 
acquisitions involving the firms in the sample, so that all of them were independent at the time of 
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the deal (while they are not necessarily so now). An industry expert assisted us in compiling the 
list, which we report in Table 2. We created two dummies: LARGE_SMALL, which takes the 
value 1 when at least one of the partners is a large player and at least one is not, and 0 otherwise; 
and ALL_LARGE, which takes the value 1 when all the partners are large players, and 0 
otherwise. The former dummy individuates asymmetric resource endowments, while the latter 
indicates bargaining symmetry and general availability of resources. 134 deals were 
LARGE_SMALL, 39 were ALL_LARGE, and there was no large player in the remaining 88, 
which provide the baseline case. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
We included full year effects in the first set of models, testing Hypothesis 1. In the second 
set of models, in which we split the sample to test the remaining hypotheses, reduced sample size 
made it impractical to use full year effects, due to excessive loss of degrees of freedom. 
Therefore in these models we used a time dummy, AFTER_1996, which takes the value 1 if the 
deal was announced after 1996 (the mid-point in terms of number of deals), and 0 otherwise. 
This dummy also allows to control for peak years (1994 and 1995) in the distribution of deals.  
Finally, we controlled for location fixed effects, to cover unmeasured country 
heterogeneity. For example, China is known for favoring joint ventures for international alliances 
established in its territory. Again, to minimize loss of degree of freedoms, we considered only 
the ten most numerous locations, which account for 70.1 percent of the observations, leaving the 
other locations as the baseline case. We provide more details about all variable definitions and 
measurement in Table 3. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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3.5. Model 
 To test our Hypothesis 1, we estimated the probability of observing a joint venture as the 
governance mode of an international alliance by a logit model, which is commonly used in entry 
mode research (Hennart, 1997). The model is: 
Pi = 1/[1+exp(-zi)] 
 Pi is the probability that an observation i is a joint venture; zi is given by this formula: 
zi = b0 + b1OFFSHOREi + b2MANUFACTURINGi + b3MARKETINGi + b4R&Di + 
b5WGIMEANi + βZi 
where β is a vector of parameters and Zi is a vector of control variables that include 
MULTILATERAL, LARGE_SMALL, ALL_LARGE, GDP, SMALL_EL, NON_HH, 
LARGE_EL, and year and location dummies.  
 To test our Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3, we divided the observations in two sub-samples 
defined by the OFFSHORE dummy. We then run our main specification on the sub-samples by 
excluding the OFFSHORE dummy; we also replaced year effects with the AFTER_1996 
dummy, to avoid excessive loss of degrees of freedom, as explained above. This sub-sample 
procedure amounts to treating the OFFSHORE dummy as a moderator of the effects of the 
model variables on the governance mode, avoiding well-known problems with interaction terms 
in logistic models (Ai & Norton, 2003). Following Hoetker (2007), we tested for differences in 
unobserved variation between the two groups; neither the likelihood-ratio test (χ2 = 0.08, p = 
0.77) or the Wald χ2 test (χ2 = 0.10, p = 0.75) suggested concerns with these sub-samples to test 
moderation. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptives 
 Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables, as well as bivariate 
correlations. All correlations between all the predictor variables are smaller than |0.40|, except 
for the correlation between two product dummies (0.62). We then examined the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of all the models that we present, finding that the largest VIF value is 
7.60, comfortably below the recommended threshold of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). 
Therefore we concluded that there are no relevant issues of multicollinearity with our data. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.2. Main specification 
 A first group of models, reported in Table 5, tests Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable 
is JV. We present the results using both coefficients and odds ratios. A positive coefficient 
indicates an increase in the probability of observing a joint venture; vice versa for negative 
coefficients. The odds ratio is the change in the odds of the joint-venture governance mode when 
the value of a predictor increases by one unit. Any odds ratio below 1 is negative, because it 
implies that an increase in the predictor reduces the odds of the joint-venture mode; odds ratios 
above 1 are positive and indicate increases in the odds of the mode. 
Model 1 includes only control variables. In Model 2, we add the dummies that specify the 
activities involved and WGIMEAN, which expresses the institutional quality of the host 
countries. In Model 3 we include our variable of interest, OFFSHORE, finding that when the 
purpose of the international alliance is offshoring, the coefficient is significantly negative (b = -
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1.784, p < 0.01) and the odds ratio is lower than 1 (OR = 0.168, p < 0.01). This means that the 
odds of equity-based governance are 83.2 percent (1- 0.168) lower in offshoring international 
alliances than they are in local market-seeking ones. These results support Hypothesis 1, which 
predicted that offshoring made the joint-venture mode less likely. The percentage of correctly 
classified observations for this model is 88.9 percent, which exceeds the chance rate (64.2%) by 
24.7 percentage points. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Notably, the odds ratio of MANUFACTURING is greater than 1 and statistically 
significant in Models 2 (p < 0.001) and 3 (p < 0.001). This is confirmed by descriptives: 82.3 
percent of the international alliances that include manufacturing activities are joint ventures, 
against 45.5 percent of the international alliances that do not include these activities. 
MARKETING is not statistically significant. The odds ratio of R&D is smaller than 1 and 
marginally significant (OR = 0.177, p < 0.10), indicating that international alliances with R&D 
activities are less likely to be joint ventures than those that do not include them. 
 
4.3. Sub-sample analysis 
 Table 6 reports the models that test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c and 3. Again, we present 
coefficients and odds ratios. JV is the dependent variable. We divided the observations into two 
sub-samples defined by the OFFSHORE dummy. The first group includes the observations in 
which the value of the dummy is 0 (model 4, “market-seeking”, N = 96), the second those in 
which it is 1 (model 5, “offshoring”, N = 165). A Chow test (DeMaris, 2004) was used to check 
whether the difference between the coefficients of the two models was statistically significant. 
The test revealed that it is (χ2 (17) = 34.052, p < 0.01). For MANUFACTURING, we found that 
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the significance of coefficients and odds ratios increase in the offshoring subsample (p < 0.01 
level), compared to the market-seeking one  (p < 0.05), providing support to our Hypothesis 2a. 
For MARKETING, we failed to find evidence of a meaningful difference between the two 
subsamples; therefore, Hypothesis 2b seems not to be supported. For R&D, we observe an 
improvement in statistical significance of the negative coefficient (odds ratio lower than 1) when 
moving from the market-seeking group (p > 0.10) to the offshoring one (p < 0.10); this result 
only weakly supports Hypothesis 2c. For WGIMEAN, the results are that the coefficient and the 
odds ratio are statistically significant only in the offshoring subsample (p < .01), indicating a 
negative impact on the dependent variable, and providing support to Hypothesis 3. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
To facilitate interpretation of the moderation role of the strategic purpose of the 
international alliance, we plotted the predicted probability of the dependent variable against our 
variables of interest (Figure 2). As the figure shows, the moderation effect is stronger for 
MANUFACTURING (which is associated with a lower probability of a joint venture in the 
market-seeking group, but not in the offshoring one) and R&D (which is associated with lower 
probability of a joint venture only in the offshoring group), and weaker, but still noticeable, for 
MARKETING and WGIMEAN. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
4.4. Further analyses 
 Table 7 presents robustness checks and post-estimation analyses. Model 6 is similar to 
our main specification, which we used to test Hypothesis 1, but it has EQUITY (including both 
joint ventures and minority investments) as the dependent variable. Again, this model supports 
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Hypothesis 1; the coefficient of OFFSHORE is negative and the odds ratio is lower than 1 (p < 
0.05). In the third column, we added marginal effects (ME), which are a measure of the 
magnitude of the relationship (Wieserma & Bowen, 2009). MEs show the impact of the predictor 
in terms of change in probability of the dependent variable.We computed MEs of predictors as 
the averages of the single MEs at each observation. We calculated that, when the value of 
OFFSHORE is 0, the average probability of equity-based governance is 85.9 percent; the 
probability drops to 75.1 percent when the value of OFFSHORE is 1 (ME = -0.108, p < 0.01). As 
a comparison, in the subsequent column we report MEs for our previous Model 3 (in which JV is 
the dependent variable): the ME of OFFSHORE is -0.144 (p < 0.01), implying that the average 
probability of observing a joint venture decreases from 85.4 percent when the value of 
OFFSHORE is 0 to 71.0 percent when the value of OFFSHORE is 1. 
Models 7 and 8 are similar to previous models 4 and 5 (which we used to test Hypotheses 
2a, 2b, 2c, and 3) but again they have EQUITY as a dependent variable. We report only 
coefficients, for brevity. The Chow test shows that the difference of the coefficients between the 
two models is statistically significant: χ2 (17) = 47.077, p < 0.01. The results confirm that the 
coefficient of MANUFACTURING is more significant in the offshoring group (p < 0.01) than it 
is in the market-seeking group (p < 0.10), adding support to Hypothesis 2a. The coefficients of 
MARKETING and R&D are not significant in the offshoring group, indicating limited 
robustness for Hypotheses 2b and 2c. As in previous results, the coefficient of WGIMEAN is 
significant only in the offshoring group (p < .01), providing further support to Hypothesis 3. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Theoretical implications 
 The purpose of the study was to compare the factors that drive the governance structure 
of international alliances associated with market-seeking strategies to those engaged in 
offshoring strategies. The guiding idea was that the likelihood of using equity-based modes as 
opposed to contractual modes is different in the case of offshoring as opposed to the well-studied 
market-access strategy. We theorized that, as a strategic purpose, offshoring makes an 
international alliance less likely to be governed as a joint venture than in the case of a market 
entry alliance. Further, strategic purpose moderates the effects on the governance mode choice of 
the shared activities of the international alliance and the quality of the institutional environment 
of the host country. Our study tried to extend the understanding of how the strategic rationale of 
participating firms influences decisions about how to organize an international alliance; previous 
literature has mostly looked at international alliances as modes of market entry (Gomes, Barnes, 
& Mahmood, 2016), while research on their role in building global offshored value chains is 
comparitevely underdeveloped. 
We used the household appliance industry to test the hypotheses, using logistic regression 
and comparing sub-samples of market-seeking and offshoring international alliances to 
determine if the weights of the different activities and levels of local institutional quality vary 
across strategic purposes. Our hypothesized relationships were largely upheld. What, then, is the 
meaning of these findings? We suggested at the beginning of this paper that more complex 
transactions should be more likely governed through equity participation, whether to reduce 
transactional risks and costs or to improve coordination of complex activities. We found that the 
odds of using a joint venture rather than a contractual alliance were 83.2% lower for offshoring 
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production oriented international alliances. This suggests that as complex as global value chains 
might be, the individual transactions that comprise them are amenable to specified contracts. 
This fits with the principles of modular production in the global value chains (McDermott et al., 
2013) in which the complexity of the system is managed by the corporate headquarters and 
individual units are given fairly specific technical objectives. At the same time, it appears that an 
alliance with responsibility for an ever changing and competitive local market is more likely to 
play a real strategic role locally, a role enhanced by the separate organization created through a 
joint venture.  
We believe that these results, and the finding that alliances which incorporate 
manufacturing tend to be governed as joint ventures, also provide insight on the relative value of 
transaction cost theory and resource-based theory in explaining alliance governance in different 
strategic circumstances. The weak results for R&D and local institutional controls, the standard 
core technologies in this mature industry, and that the same firms and countries are involved in 
both strategies, implies that transaction costs should not be systematically higher for either 
strategy. Thus, the greater use of the strategically flexible joint ventures for locally focused 
market entry suggests that coordination needs tend to dominate under this strategy (Phene & 
Tallman, 2012). Likewise, the focus on multiple contracts to oversee an offshore production 
strategy indicates that coordination needs tend to be lower. In this, complex coordination is 
managed at the global headquarter level, allowing for relatively simple individual transactions 
with efficient governance through contracts. 
Finally, our findings enrich the offshoring literature, which has not frequently focused on 
cooperative forms of transaction governance and has largely ignored the question of choosing 
between equity and non-equity forms to manage outsourced offshore production. MNCs may use 
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a variety of organizational forms to implement and control offshore value-adding activities, 
spanning everything from wholly owned operations to market-based transactions with suppliers. 
Most outsourced offshore production activities actually involve repeated, complex contractual 
engagements or shared equity involvement, which differ from market-entry alliances in terms of 
optimal degree of control, or commitment of resources, and require further investigation. 
 
5.2 Managerial implications 
 The governance mode of international alliances is a primary driver of their performance. 
The operational and financial results from international alliances are often frustrating, which 
emphasizes the need for robust theoretical frameworks that provide a reference for decision 
making. In a managerial perspective, our most notable finding is that the drivers of governance 
choice between contractual alliances and joint ventures are considerably different when the 
strategic purpose of the international alliance is market entry than when it is offshoring. Strategic 
purpose not only affects the choice of governance structure, but also moderates the effects of 
several other tested and control variables on the choice between contractual and equity-based 
alliance form. 
Our results suggest that international alliances are indeed an appropriate, flexible way to 
implement offshoring in global networks. This shows that the choice of equity or contract-based 
alliance is an alternative that companies should better scrutinize when deciding the route to 
implement the delocalization of their value chain activities, beyond the typical alternatives of 
captive offshoring and offshore arms’-length outsourcing. The data presented in this study about 
major appliance strategic alliances give some substantial insights on the drivers of the 
governance choice when the objective is to delocalize the activities along a global value chain. 
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Our results further suggest that patterns of influences on governance decisions for traditional 
market-entry international alliances are not completely relevant to the choice of alliance 
governance in the case of offshore value production. Managers need to be aware that vertical 
alliances may be exposed to relatively low transactional complexity, at least in mature industries, 
which makes equity forms redundant to control offshored activities. 
 
5.3. Limitations and directions for future research 
 It is worthwhile to underline that some research limitations may exist. The first limitation 
is that a single industry, major appliances, was chosen to perform the empirical analysis. As a 
traditional manufacturing industry that uses but has not been transformed by information 
technology, home appliances seems to be fairly representative of a number of established 
industrial sectors that are transitioning to globally networked value chains. However, specifics of 
industry size, geographical dispersion or the types of players can be characterizing factors, 
whose changes in another industry could modify the outcome of the investigation. The time 
horizon could be a limitation, too: our database of major appliance alliances covers a medium-
length term of 25 years. Results could be different if looking back further in time, for example by 
considering the early history of the modern major appliance industry since it shift to mass 
production after WWII, or if focusing the attention only on its most recent history, namely the 
last decade, when dispersed production has become more common. Linked to the latter, a 
drawback for the empirical investigation may arise from the source of data. SDC Platinum is a 
research database developed from professional sources, both publicly available and private. Its 
accuracy is guaranteed from the Nineties onward; therefore, the represented alliances before that 
date can be only partial. Furthermore, even if its sources are extensive, this does not ensures the 
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total inclusion of the strategic alliances. Finally, our dataset was relatively small and did not 
allow us to explore further issues related to the choice of governance modes, such the use of 
different modes in different value chains activities across host markets by the same firm (Benito, 
Petersen, & Welch, 2009). 
Our findings suggest that the phenomenon of offshoring through contractual alliances 
requires further study — the “rules” developed from earlier studies of market entry international 
alliances cannot be assumed to be relevant in this new context. We also supported the value of 
modular strategies in the offshoring production case. It would be interesting to perform a finer 
distinction in the governance types of strategic alliances, beyond equity versus non-equity, in 
order to study their drivers in the offshoring context. Furthermore, the links between 
collaborative agreements and other modalities to manage internationally dispersed value chain 
activities could be explored, since cooperation may be the first step in preparing for other moves 
in the form of mergers and acquisitions or greenfield investments. We believe that further 
investigation of the role of cooperative agreements in governing offshore outsourcing 
arrangements is essential to understanding the dynamics of dispersed value chains. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the sample across locations and home countries. Location is defined as the country that 
hosts the deal. Home countries are counted as the sum of the occurrences of partners from focal countries 
in the deals in the sample. 
Country Location 
Home 
countries Country Location 
Home 
countries 
Algeria - 1 Kyrgyzstan 1 - 
Argentina 2 1 Malaysia 7 11 
Australia - 7 Mexico 3 3 
Belarus - 1 Netherlands 1 5 
Belgium - 1 New Zealand 2 2 
Brazil 5 5 Norway 1 1 
Bulgaria 2 2 Pakistan 1 1 
Canada 1 5 Philippines 1 1 
China 83 104 Poland 2 2 
Colombia 1 1 Republic of Ireland - 3 
Czechoslovakia 3 4 Russian Federation 3 5 
Denmark - 1 Saudi Arabia 4 4 
East Germany 2 2 Singapore - 3 
Egypt 2 2 Slovak Republic 1 2 
Finland - 2 South Africa 3 3 
France 2 7 South Korea 14 38 
Germany - 16 Spain 1 3 
Greece 2 4 Sweden 1 23 
Hong Kong 2 12 Switzerland 1 3 
Hungary 1 4 Taiwan 6 8 
India 22 23 Thailand 6 4 
Indonesia 7 7 Turkey 5 10 
Iran 1 1 Ukraine - 1 
Israel 1 2 United Arab Emirates 3 2 
Italy 3 23 United Kingdom 5 17 
Japan 15 83 United States 14 70 
Jordan 1 1 Uzbekistan 4 5 
Kazakhstan 4 5 Vietnam 9 9 
   Total 261 566 
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Table 2. 
List of large players. Firms when included in list based on their having established brands (globally or in 
significant regions), multinational presence, multiple product categories and being listed in stock 
exchanges over the period. 
Arcelik GE Mabe Philips Videocon 
Bosch Siemens Godrej Matsushita Samsung Whirlpool 
Candy Gorenje Maytag Sanyo Wuxi 
Daewoo Haier Merloni Sharp  
Daikin Hisense Kelon Midea Thomson  
Electrolux Hitachi Miele Toshiba  
Fagor LG Mitsubishi Vestel  
 
Table 3 
Variable definitions. 
Variable Definition 
JV It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is a joint venture, and 0 
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum. 
EQUITY It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is a joint venture or a 
minority investment, and 0 otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum. 
OFFSHORE It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is not mainly intended to 
serve the local market, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually coded, based on SDC 
Platinum, press releases, and company materials. 
MANUFACTURING It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to 
assembly of products, production of components, and manufacturing services, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press 
releases, and company materials. 
MARKETING It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to 
distribution, selling, and promotion, and 0 otherwise. Sources: manually coded, 
based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and company materials. 
R&D It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to 
basic and applied research and product development, and 0 otherwise. Sources: 
manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and company 
materials. 
WGIMEAN Aggregate indicator of quality of institutions in the host country of the 
international alliances. It consists in the mean of the six World Bank’s 
Governance indicators: control of corruption (degree to which public power is 
used for private gain or controlled by private interests), government 
effectiveness (quality of the public service, independence from the political 
process, government’s commitment to implementation of policies), political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism (the probability that a government is 
overthrown illegally or by violence), regulatory quality (soundness of policies 
for regulating and developing the private sector), rule of law (the extent to 
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which people are confident in and respect the laws), voice and accountability 
(freedom of people to participate in government selection, including freedom of 
speech, press, and association). Each indicator ranges from − 2.5 to + 2.5, with 
higher scores indicating higher institutional quality. Source: World Bank. 
EXPERIENCE The number of deals entered by all the partners of the international alliance in 
five years before the focal deal. Source: manually computed, based on SDC 
Platinum. 
DISTANCE Average distance of all the participants from the location of the international 
alliances. The distance of each participant consists in the air miles between the 
the capital city of its home country and the capital city of the host country 
(“great circle distance”, Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Source: manually 
computed. 
MULTILATERAL It takes the value 1 when the international alliance has more than two 
participants, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually computed, based on SDC 
Platinum. 
LARGE_SMALL It takes the value 1 when at least one the participants in the international alliance 
is a large player and at least one is not, and 0 otherwise. Source: a list of large 
players manually compiled with the assistance of an industry expert (see Table 
2). 
ALL_LARGE It takes the value 1 when all the participants in the international alliances are 
large players, and 0 otherwise. Source: a list of large players manually compiled 
with the assistance of an industry expert (see Table 2). 
GDP Gross domestic product of the host country in trillions of US dollars. Source: 
World Bank. 
SMALL_EL It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve small 
electrical appliances (microwave ovens, vacuum cleaners, and small kitchen 
machines). Source: manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and 
company materials. 
NON_HH It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve non-
household appliances, including commercial appliances (large size freezers, 
washing machines and other appliances used in restaurants, hospitals, 
communities, etc.), parts, and services. Source: manually coded, based on SDC 
Platinum, press releases, and company materials. 
LARGE_EL It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve large 
electrical appliances (air conditioners, dishwashers, dryers, freezers and 
refrigerators, and washing machines). Source: manually coded, based on SDC 
Platinum, press releases, and company materials. 
AFTER_1996 It takes the value 1 when the international alliance was announced after 1996 
(the mid point of the series). Source: SDC Platinum. 
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Table 4. 
Descriptives and correlations. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 JV 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 
               
2 EQUITY 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 
              
3 OFFSHORE 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.06 1.00 
             
4 MANUF. 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.35 0.29 1.00 
            
5 MARKETING 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.35 -0.40 1.00 
           
6 R&D 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 -0.34 -0.31 0.07 -0.11 0.02 1.00 
          
7 WGIMEAN 0.08 0.73 -1.38 1.87 -0.33 -0.30 -0.03 -0.27 0.18 0.29 1.00 
         
8 EXPERIENCE 3.15 4.15 0.00 28.00 -0.14 -0.17 0.19 -0.05 -0.06 0.21 0.05 1.00 
        
9 DISTANCE 1.97 1.34 0.00 7.85 -0.14 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.03 1.00 
       
10 MULTILAT. 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.15 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
      
11 ALL_LARGE 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.29 0.17 0.33 0.04 0.05 1.00 
     
12 LARGE_SM. 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.43 1.00 
    
13 GDP 1.37 2.43 0.00 15.53 -0.20 -0.21 -0.03 -0.17 0.21 0.21 0.37 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.13 -0.19 1.00 
   
14 SMALL_EL 0.20 0.41 0.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.11 0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.14 1.00 
  
15 NON_HH 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.13 0.13 0.01 -0.09 1.00 
 
16 LARGE_EL 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.22 -0.11 -0.05 -0.14 0.13 -0.12 0.08 0.19 0.13 -0.21 -0.62 -0.25 1.00 
17 AFTER_1996 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.28 -0.33 0.00 -0.18 0.06 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.22 0.11 0.05 -0.03 
N = 261. Correlation coefficients larger than |.12| are significant at the p = .05 level (two-tailed).   
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Table 5. 
Logistic regression. Determinants of the governance mode. 
 Model 1 
DV: JV 
Model 2 
DV: JV 
Model 3 
DV: JV 
 Coefficient OR Coefficient OR Coefficient OR 
OFFSHORE     -1.784** 0.168** 
     (0.664) (0.112) 
MANUFACTURING   2.177** 8.818** 2.951*** 19.124*** 
   (0.737) (6.502) (0.845) (16.165) 
MARKETING   1.107+ 3.027+ 0.908 2.480 
   (0.640) (0.057) (0.687) (1.703) 
R&D   -1.965* 0.140* -1.731+ 0.177+ 
   (0.851) (0.119) (0.904) (0.160) 
WGIMEAN   -0.486 0.615 -0.458 0.633 
   (0.421) (0.259) (0.435) (0.275) 
EXPERIENCE -0.037 0.964 0.017 1.018 0.054 1.056 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.072) (0.074) (0.079) (0.083) 
DISTANCE -0.120 0.887 -0.084 0.920 -0.138 0.871 
 (0.148) (0.131) (0.157) (0.145) (0.172) (0.150) 
MULTILATERAL 2.808* 16.572* 3.598* 36.521* 3.623* 37.434* 
 (1.138) (18.856) (1.550) (56.619) (1.617) (60.542) 
LARGE_SMALL -0.887 0.412 -0.567 0.567 -0.263 0.769 
 (0.613) (0.252) (0.666) (0.378) (0.699) (0.538) 
ALL_LARGE -1.691+ 0.184+ -1.709+ 0.181+ -1.602 0.201 
 (0.865) (0.159) (0.955) (0.173) (0.998) (0.201) 
GDP -0.377* 0.686* -0.465* 0.628* -0.482* 0.617* 
 (0.175) (0.120) (0.181) (0.113) (0.187) (0.115) 
SMALL_EL -0.725 0.484 -0.429 0.651 0.030 1.031 
 (0.647) (0.313) (0.696) (0.453) (0.739) (0.761) 
NON_HH -0.043 0.958 0.268 1.307 0.449 1.568 
 (0.575) (0.551) (0.649) (0.848) (0.659) (1.034) 
LARGE_EL 0.708 2.030 0.558 1.747 0.781 2.183 
 (0.638) (1.295) (0.696) (1.215) (0.724) (1.580) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 3.630** 37.732** 1.390 4.015 1.721 5.588 
 (1.133) (42.763) (1.384) (5.556) (1.496) (8.362) 
N 261 
0.370 
-89.331 
261 
0.434 
-80.357 
261 
0.464 
-76.092 
pseudo R2 
Log likelihood 
Models report b values (coefficient) and odds ratios (OR). Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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Table 6. 
Logistic regression. Subsample analysis of determinants of the governance mode. 
  Model 4 
Market-seeking 
DV: JV 
 Model 5 
Offshoring 
DV: JV 
  Coefficient OR  Coefficient OR 
MANUFACTURING  3.177* 23.968*  3.015** 20.388** 
  (1.348) (32.314)  (0.967) (19.725) 
MARKETING  1.738 5.687  0.583 1.792 
  (1.406) (7.996)  (0.626) (1.122) 
R&D  -1.703 0.182  -1.536+ 0.215+ 
  (2.494) (0.454)  (0.837) (0.180) 
WGIMEAN  -0.676 0.509  -1.155** 0.315** 
  (0.880) (0.448)  (0.449) (0.142) 
EXPERIENCE  -0.029 0.971  -0.023 0.977 
  (0.172) (0.167)  (0.077) (0.075) 
DISTANCE  -0.472 0.623  0.258 1.295 
  (0.288) (0.180)  (0.209) (0.270) 
MULTILATERAL  6.177+ 481.634+  4.552+ 94.873+ 
  (3.280) (1579.504)  (2.758) (261.670) 
LARGE_SMALL  -5.170** 0.006**  0.802 2.231 
  (1.947) (0.011)  (0.691) (1.540) 
ALL_LARGE  -2.807 0.060  -1.373 0.253 
  (1.915) (0.116)  (0.900) (0.228) 
GDP  0.041 1.042  -0.095 0.909 
  (0.267) (0.278)  (0.149) (0.136) 
SMALL_EL  2.909* 18.337*  0.026 1.026 
  (1.442) (26.438)  (0.811) (0.833) 
NON_HH  3.564+ 35.298+  -0.251 0.778 
  (1.905) (67.252)  (0.637) (0.496) 
LARGE_EL  4.173* 64.897*  -0.084 0.920 
  (1.976) (128.259)  (0.755) (0.694) 
AFTER_1996  -3.064* 0.047*  -1.629** 0.196 
  (1.429) (0.067)  (0.568) (0.111) 
Location effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Intercept  0.810 2.247  -1.222 0.295 
  (2.203) (4.950)  (1.459) (0.430) 
N  96 
0.549 
-20.873 
 161 
0.395 
-57.279 
Pseudo R2   
Log likelihood   
Models report b values (coefficient) and odds ratios (OR). Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 7. 
Robustness checks and post-estimation analyses.  
 Model 6 
DV: Equity 
Model 3 
DV: JV 
Model 7 
Market-seeking 
DV: Equity 
Model 8 
Offshoring 
DV: Equity 
 Coefficient OR ME ME Coefficient Coefficient 
OFFSHORE -1.551* 0.212* -0.108** -0.144**   
 (0.699) (0.148) (0.042) (0.044)   
MANUFACTURING 3.036** 20.813** 0.307** 0.343*** 4.352+ 3.474** 
 (0.908) (18.897) (0.095) (0.097) (2.374) (1.060) 
MARKETING 1.084 2.958 0.077 0.077 4.725+ 0.629 
 (0.794) (2.347) (0.050) (0.053) (2.677) (0.733) 
R&D -1.452 0.234 -0.133 -0.195+ 1.790 -0.735 
 (1.019) (0.239) (0.104) (0.114) (3.223) (0.892) 
WGIMEAN -0.395 0.674 -0.031 -0.041 -1.705 -1.549** 
 (0.520) (0.350) (0.040) (0.039) (1.895) (0.586) 
EXPERIENCE 0.027 1.027 0.002 0.005 -0.057 -0.087 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.007) (0.007) (0.201) (0.092) 
DISTANCE -0.285 0.752 -0.022 -0.012 1.529+ 0.169 
 (0.194) (0.146) (0.015) (0.015) (0.923) (0.227) 
MULTILATERAL 4.141+ 62.866+ 0.183*** 0.203*** 14.112 5.913 
 (2.193) (137.854) (0.042) (0.043) (15.736) (4.010) 
LARGE_SMALL -0.739 0.478 -0.058 -0.024 -19.136 0.921 
 (0.810) (0.387) (0.063) (0.063) (51.147) (0.816) 
ALL_LARGE -1.946+ 0.143+ -0.179 -0.170 -16.697 -1.782+ 
 (1.106) (0.158) (0.112) (0.116) (51.047) (1.080) 
GDP -0.425* 0.653* -0.033* -0.044** -0.615 -0.002 
 (0.187) (0.122) (0.014) (0.016) (0.698) (0.162) 
SMALL_EL 0.671 1.956 0.049 0.003 8.615* 0.362 
 (0.802) (1.570) (0.056) (0.066) (4.360) (0.879) 
NON_HH 0.004 1.004 0.000 0.039 12.745 -0.726 
 (0.672) (0.675) (0.052) (0.054) (50.576) (0.691) 
LARGE_EL 1.350+ 3.856+ 0.106+ 0.072 16.276 0.036 
 (0.784) (3.024) (0.060) (0.0068) (50.823) (0.829) 
AFTER_1996     -10.388+ -2.830*** 
     (5.689) (0.734) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Location effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 1.962 7.111   7.107 0.085 
 (1.670) (11.872)   (5.988) (1.638) 
N 261  96 165 
pseudo R2 0.508  0.746 0.417 
Log likelihood -65.511  -11.367 -46.422 
Models report b values (coefficient), odds ratios (OR) and marginal effects (ME) calculated as averages of marginal 
effects at each observation. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1. 
Distribution of the deals across years. N = 261. 
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Figure 2. 
Interaction effects: Probability of the joint venture mode. 
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